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IMPACT OF FEDERAL NOISE ABATEMENT
POLICY ON AIRCRAFT FINANCING
W. PHILLIP WHITCOMB
On November 18, 1976, the then Secretary of Transportation,
William T. Coleman, and the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA), John L. McLucas, announced the
federal government's noise abatement policy.' This policy estab-
lishes a timetable which requires all domestic commercial aircraft
weighing in excess of 75,000 pounds to meet Federal Aviation
Regulation Part 36 (FAR 36)' noise limits by January 1, 1985.'
Compliance with the prescribed noise limits could be effectuated
by either aircraft replacement or by the retrofit of existing non-
complying aircraft with sound absorbing material or more tech-
nologically advanced engines. In order to meet these required
standards, the expenditure of a considerable amount of capital will
be required by the nation's domestic airline industry. Such a mas-
sive outlay of capital will directly affect the ability of an already
financially troubled industry to support the research and develop-
ment, not to mention the procurement, of new technologically ad-
vanced equipment.
FAR 36 Noise Limits and Scheduled Compliance
Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, which became
effective on December 1, 1969," was adopted to implement 49
U.S.C. 1431' and provides "present and future relief and protection
to the public from unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic booms
.... The purpose of FAR 36, to prevent further escalation of
aircraft noise, is accomplished by prescribing noise standards for
IU.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY
(1976).
2 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1977).
a 14 C.F.R. § 91.305 (1977).
434 Fed. Reg. 18,355 (1969).
'49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-411, § 1, 82 Stat.
395.
649 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
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the type certification" of subsonic transport category aircraft and
for the type certification of subsonic turbojet powered aircraft re-
gardless of category.' This amendment to the Federal Aviation
Regulations initiated the noise abatement regulatory program of
the FAA under the statutory authority established by Congress
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'
Since the adoption of FAR 36, the FAA has adopted additional
amendments to FAR 36 which have increased the protection of
the public from aircraft noise by providing more stringent noise
levels. These levels must be met before type certification of an
aircraft is awarded by the FAA. The most recent of these amend-
ments,"° which became effective October 1, 1977, provides (1)
three stages of aircraft noise levels with specified noise limits, (2)
definitions for classifying aircraft under each stage, (3) require-
ments that applicants for new type certifications on or after No-
vember 5, 1975, must comply with the noise limits established
under "Stage 3," and (4) acoustical change requirements for air-
planes in each noise level stage.11 Thus, FAR 36, as amended,
establishes three stages of aircraft noise levels and defines which
airplanes qualify under each stage."
7 A type certification is granted by the FAA to establish the airworthiness of
each new distinctive model of aircraft as designated by the manufacturer.
' 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355 (1969).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973.
1042 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977).
"t This amendment provides more restrictive noise levels than did previous
standards by approximately two EPNdB. (Noise levels are measured as effective
perceived noise in decibels-EPNdB.) The FAA has further proposed even more
restrictive noise levels based upon draft modifications to the International Civil
Aviation Organization's Annex 16 noise levels in a Supplemental Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, Notice No. 75-37C, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,375 (1976).
"2A "Stage 1" airplane is defined as an airplane which does not comply with
the takeoff, sideline, and approach noise levels of "Stage 2" or "Stage 3" air-
planes. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360, 12,371 (1977) (to be codified as 14 C.F.R. S
36.1(f)(2)).
A "Stage 1" airplane may not, after changes in the type's design, exceed noise
levels created before such changes were made. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,371 (1977). Under
"Stage 1' the tradeoff provisions of section C36.5(b) of Appendix C of FAR 36
may not be applied to increase noise levels. See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360, 12,372
(1977) (to be codified as 14 C.F.R. S C36.5(b)).
A "Stage 2" airplane is defined as an airplane that has been shown under this
Part to comply with "Stage 2" noise levels. The Stage 2 noise levels, regardless of
the number of engines, are as follows:
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These noise limits will require an average decrease in noise
(i) For takeoff-108 EPNdB for maximum weights of 600,000
pounds or more, reduced by 5 EPNdB per halving of the
600,000 pounds maximum weight down to 93 EPNdB for max-
imum weights of 75,000 pounds and less.
(ii) For sideline and approach-108 EPNdB for maximum weights
of 600,000 pounds or more, reduced by 2 EPNdB per halving
of the 600,000 pounds maximum weight down to 102 EPNdB
for maximum weights of 75,000 pounds and less. 42 Fed. Reg.
12,360, 12,372 (to be codified as 14 C.F.R. S C36.5(a)(3)).
A "Stage 3" airplane must meet the more restrictive "Stage 3" noise limits
(42 Fed. Reg. 12,360, 12,371 (1977)) with the application of tradeoff provisions.
These noise levels vary with the number of engines powering an airplane, and
are as follows:
(i) For airplanes with more than 3 engines-
(A) For takeoff-106 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 4 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds maximum weight down to 90 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 53,125 pounds and less;
(B) For sideline-103 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2.56 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds maximum weight down to 96 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 75,130 pounds and less; and
(C) For approach-105 EPNdB for maxmum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2 EPNd per halving of the
850,000 pounds maximum weight down to 98 EPNdB for
maximum weight of 75,130 pounds and less.
(ii) For airplanes with 3 engines-
(A) For takeoff-104 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 4 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds maximum weight down to 90 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 75,130 and less;
(B) For sideline-103 EPNdB for maximum weights of 882,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2.56 EPNdB per halving of the
882,000 pounds maximum weight down to 96 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 132,538 pounds and less; and
(C) For approach-105 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds weight down to 98 EPNdB for maximum
weights of 75,130 pounds and less.
(iii) For airplanes with fewer than 3 engines-
(A) For takeoff-101 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 4 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds maximum weight down to 89 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 106,250 pounds and less;
(B) For sideline-103 EPNdB for maximum weights of 882,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2.56 EPNdB per halving of the
882,000 pounds maximum weight down to 94 EPNdB for
maximum weights of 77,120 pounds and less; and
(C) For approach-105 EPNdB for maximum weights of 850,000
pounds or more, reduced by 2 EPNdB per halving of the
850,000 pounds weight down to 98 EPNdB for maximum
weights of 75,130 pounds and less. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360,
12,372 (1977) (to be codfied as 14 C.F.R. S C36.5 (a)(3)).
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levels of twelve to sixteen EPNdB from first generation turbojet
aircraft. 3 This reduction of noise at the source, when combined
with new approach and takeoff procedures, would substantially
decrease the perceptible noise levels emitted by individual aircraft.
Due to a forecasted aviation growth, however, the aircraft noise
problem is expected to increase despite the introduction of quieter
aircraft. Between 1975 and 1990, annual aircraft operations are
expected to increase from ten million to sixteen million, creating
additional noise exposure that could more than offset the reduc-
tion in noise levels resulting from the replacement of the older
aircraft by newer, quieter models."
At the end of 1975, there were 2,148 jet aircraft in service
with the United States air carrier fleet." Of these 2,148 aircraft,
it is estimated that 1,586 do not conform to FAR 36' and must
be replaced or retrofitted in order to comply with the prescribed
noise limits. Moreover, assuming the normal attrition of pre-FAR
36 aircraft,' it is estimated by the FAA that between 1,171 and
1,246 aircraft will still fail to comply with FAR 36 in 1984,"
and that by 1990 there will be only a fifty-two percent compliance."
In order to accelerate compliance by the airlines with FAR 36,
the Department of Transportation and the FAA amended the
Federal Aviation Regulations' to include a timetable for progres-
"3 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 39
(1976).
14 id. at 23.
15 Id. at 22.
" Breakdown of aircraft which do not meet FAR 36 requirements (prior to
Amendment 7 becoming effective):
Boeing 707/720 & DC-8 (4 engine) 508
Boeing 727 (3 engine) 590
Boeing 737/DC-9/BAC-111 (2 engine) 488
Total 1,586
The Future of Aviation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation and Trans-
portation R & D of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 616 (1976) (statement by John L. McLucas) [hereinafter cited as
McLucas].
'"Those aircraft produced prior to the adoption of FAR 36 in 1969 were not
required to meet the standards implemented by the regulation. U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 22 (1976).
18 R.K. ELLINGSWORTH, Administration Sets Noise Policy, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 22, 1976, at 13 [hereinafter cited as Ellingsworth].
"U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 23
(1976).
2041 Fed. Reg. 56,046 (1976) amended FAR 91 to include a specific timetable
COMMENTS
sive compliance of all domestic commercial aircraft by January 1,
1985.1 This schedule requires the compliance of all Boeing 707's
and 720's and McDonnell Douglas DC-8's with FAR 36 noise
levels within eight years, with one quarter of the above mentioned
fleet complying within four years and one-half within six years. 2
The schedule requires all other noncomplying aircraft types 3 to
be in compliance with FAR 36 noise levels within six years, with
one-half of these aircraft complying within four years. " Exceptions
to these time limits would occur for noncomplying aircraft when
replacement airplanese have been ordered and are scheduled for
delivery prior to January 1, 1985. This exception would exist only
under a plan approved by the FAA, however, and would be effec-
tive only to the date specified in that plan."
This progressive compliance schedule was developed by the FAA
to permit the airlines sufficient time to determine whether a retrofit
of existing aircraft with sound absorbing materials or refanned
engines would be sufficiently effective in meeting the FAR 36
noise limits, or whether a replacement program utilizing the most
technologically advanced aircraft available would be preferred.'
A combination of these programs would seem most logical. Many
aircraft may be too close to the end of their projected life to invest
the capital necessary for retrofitting, while other aircraft possessing
an adequate remaining life could be economically retrofitted. How-
for aircraft operated under certificates issued under FAR 121 and 135. See 14
C.F.R. S 91.305(b) (1977).
21 14 C.F.R. S 91.305(c) (1977).
22 14 C.F.R. 5 91.305(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i) (1977). These regulations include
all aircraft which have four engines with no bypass ratio or a bypass ratio less
than two. (A bypass ration represents a ratio of the amount of ingested air which
bypasses the jet engine core (fan flow) to the amount of air that passes through
the jet engine core (core engine flow).)
" Proposed legislation would exempt all two and three engine aircraft from
compliance until 1990. See R.K. Ellingsworth, House Unit Eases Noise Rule
Deadline, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 4, 1977, at 26. Aircraft falling within
this category would include all two and three engine noncomplying aircraft now
being operated by the domestic carriers (B-727s and 737s, DC-9s, and BAC-I1 Is),
and the noncomplying Boeing 747s.
-14 C.F.R. §§ 91.305(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2)(ii) (1977).
'- 14 C.F.R. 5 91.305(c) (1977). A replacement airplane is defined as one
which is shown to comply with Part 36 prior to the issuance of an original
standard airworthiness certificate.
2 id.
" 41 Fed. Reg. 56,050 (1976).
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ever, the action taken by any carrier will greatly depend upon the
ability of that carrier to generate the necessary capital to finance
any given plan.
Financial State of the Industry
Since the peak years in the mid-1960's, the operating perform-
ance 8 of the nation's airlines, particularly the domestic trunk car-
riers, has deteriorated significantly." As the industry's operating
performance has declined, so has its gross revenues and net profits.
At the same time, debt to equity ratios have increased, and debt
financing or the sale of equity and subordinated debentures in the
public market has become extremely difficult.'
This erosion of the airline industry's financial base has been
caused by several factors. The industry's current problems origi-
nated in the late 1960's with the placement of initial orders for
wide-bodied airplanes.' By 1968, the carriers had experienced
twenty-eight years of continuous traffic growth which had averaged
eighteen percent per year.3 This growth, coupled with increased
operating efficiencies, resulted in an industry-wide annual net profit
of 5.75 percent from 1964 to 1968.' In 1968, the industry's out-
look was favorable due to the strong U.S. economy and the antici-
pation of further traffic growth being forecast by both industry and
government. ' With this bright forecast and the industry being
federally regulated, the financial community allowed the debt to
28 An airline's operating performance is a reflection of its efficiency with re-
gard to minimizing expenses (labor, fuel costs, maintenance, new equipment
acquisitions, etc.) while maximizing its operating revenues (air fares and way-
bills).
29 Aviation Economics: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations
& Review and the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 583 (1976) (statement by Frederick W.
Bradley, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Bradley, Aviation Economcs].
3 Due to current poor earnings, unresponsiveness of the CAB, and apprehen-
sions surrounding the current deregulation proposals, the airlines have been un-
able to raise any equity, near-equity (subordinated, convertible debentures) or
straight debt. There has been no airline equity offer since July 11, 1972, and no
other form of public offering (excluding exchange offers) since January 17,
1973. Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 585.





equity ratio of the carriers to climb above those accepted by finan-
cial institutions for nonregulated businesses. '
Since 1968, however, the carrier's financial base has gradually
weakened. The high levels of traffic growth required to fill the in-
creased capacity offered by the introduction into service of wide-
bodied aircraft in 1970 never materialized. The growth of traffic
volumes had virtually ceased by 1974." Coupled with this decrease
in the growth of traffic volume was a substantial increase in indus-
try-wide operating costs. Especially steep have been the increases
recorded for labor and fuel." Labor costs represent about forty per-
cent of the total operational costs in the industry today.' The aver-
age cost per employee was approximately $21,000 in 1975, up from
$17,000 in 1973, or twelve percent in two years."' Increases in
the cost of jet fuel have been even more pronounced. While ac-
counting for approximately twenty percent of the airline's operat-
ing expense, the cost per gallon of domestic fuel has jumped from
twelve cents to thirty-one cents since mid-1973; a 150 percent
increase. ' Despite total fuel consumption in 1975 below the 1973
33 The regulated environment of the commercial aviation industry was per-
ceived to limit the business risk involved in lending above the more accepted debt
to equity ratio of one to one, the uppermost limit which institutional lenders
would tolerate in an unregulated industry. A ratio of two to one has become
the maximum allowable in a regulated industry. See Bradley, Aviation Economics,
supra note 29, at 584, 588. For private carriers, institutional lenders like to see
private airline customers have a debt to equity ratio of under 1.5:1, defining debt
to include capitalized leases and equity to include subordinated debt and preferred
stock. For government-owned or -supported carriers, a higher debt to equity re-
lationship is permitted. 33 INTERwvA 43 (1977) (statement by Frederick W.
Bradley, Jr.).
"' In 1974, traffic growth (in passenger miles) measured only a 0.6% increase
over 1973 for U.S. scheduled airlines. The Future of Aviation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation and Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on
Science & Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1976) (statement by Karl G.
Harr, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Harr].
"Since 1968, the industry has experienced a 186% increase in the price of
fuel and a 93% increase in the cost of labor, only partially offset by higher fares.
Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 584.
" The Future of Aviation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation and
Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1976) (statement by George W. James) [hereinafter cited
as James].
& Aviation Economics: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations
& Review and the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 582 (1976) (statement by George P.
Jenkins) [hereinafter cited as Jenkins].
40 Id.
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rate, the industry spent $1.6 billion more for fuel in 1975 than in
1973."' Fuel costs will continue to increase as old fuel acquisition
contracts expire and new ones are negotiated by the airlines."
Labor costs will likewise increase. ' In addition, cost increases due
to inflation have been recorded for other goods and services con-
sumed by the airlines." These include food, spare parts, landing
fees (up 140 percent since 1967), rentals, ground vehicles, travel
agent commissions, construction, and maintenance-all the neces-
sary services to operate an airline.'
While all operating expenses have steadily increased, the average
airline ticket price has not demonstrated a proportionate increase.
Between 1948 and 1975, the Consumer Price Index increased 123
percent while the average airfare increased only twenty-two per-
cent." From 1965 to 1975, the passenger yield (average fare per
passenger mile) has increased thirty percent while total unit costs
have increased about forty percent." Despite a recent increase in
traffic growth," the lag of fare increases well behind increased
costs has resulted in operational expenses exceeding operational
revenues. This has occurred despite the fact that 100 aircraft have
been, grounded and that the industry's labor force has been cut by
10,000 workers."' The end result has been a substantial decrease
in net profits."
These increased expenses, when coupled with the excess seating
41 Id.
"Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 584.
"' Standard & Poors estimates that labor costs will continue to rise at a
10-11% annual rate. T. Canning, Air Transportation Analysis, STANDARD & PooRs
INDUST Y SURVEYS at A64 (1977).
"The rate of U.S. inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index in-
creased from 1.7% in 1965 to 9.7% in 1975. James, supra note 38, at 504.
"Jenkins, supra note 39, at 582.
'James, supra note 38, at 505.
47 Id. at 504.
"Overall domestic traffic for the trunk airlines scored a full-year gain of 10%
in 1976. T. Canning, Air Transportation Analysis, STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY
SURVEYS at A63 (1977).
4, James, supra note 38, at 504.
80 For the six years from 1970 (the year of the first widebodied delivery)
through 1975, the industry earnings averaged $78 million on average total reve-
nues of $10,773 million for a net margin of only .72%. In 1975, the airlines'
performance was particularly poor with the domestic trunks plus Pan Am losing
73.5 million on revenues of $14,146 million. Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra
note 29, at 584.
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capacity generated by the overly-optimistic ordering of wide-bodied
airplanes and the decrease in traffic volume, have resulted in re-
duced profit margins. In 1965, the industry's earnings reached
$367 million. 1 Since then the industry's average annual earnings
have been only $160 million.' Expressed in terms of profit mar-
gins, the industry earned 7.4 cents on the dollar in 1965, aver-
aged 1.6 cents for the decade 1966-1975, and lost 0.7 cents in
1975.," During the early 1970's, the U.S. airlines' return on invest-
ment fluctuated from 1.2 percent in 1970 to a high of 6.4 in 1974."
In 1975, the industry's return on investment was $900 million
below the CAB standard." Despite an increase in traffic volume in
1976,"' the profit margin was only 2.5 percent;' still far below the
CAB recommended standard for a healthy airline industry. With-
out substantial increase in the return on investment, the airlines
are not capable of internally generating the sums of cash required
to finance new technologically advanced equipment or to retrofit
existing equipment for compliance with FAR 36 noise require-
ments.
This low rate of return on investment created a need for the
airlines to turn to alternate forms of financing for new equipment
This resulted in debt financing through commercial banks and
insurance companies. With a substantial outstanding debt" and
no new equity offerings since 1973," some airline's debt/equity
ratios have become unacceptable to the major commercial lending
institutions." Institutional lenders (mainly insurance companies)
'1 James, supra note 38, at 504.
2 Id.
" Id.
54 Harr, supra note 36, at 429.
"In 1975, the industry lost approximately $100 million while the industry re-
quired a net earning of $800 million to meet the CAB standard of 12% return
on investment. Harr, supra note 36, at 429.
"See note 48 supra.
17 D.W. Sommers, Financial Analysis of Industry 1976-1977, INDUSTRY WEEK.
March 28, 1977, at 65.
62 The industry's present outstanding debt is the result of long-term loans for
financing new equipment, most notably the wide-bodied aircraft, and net operating
losses in fiscal years 1973 and 1975.
"See note 30 supra.
10Debt to equity ratios varied from a low of 64:36 to a high of 85:15 for the
four domestic airlines in which Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has invest-
ed (Pan Am, American, TWA, and United Airlines). In an unregulated industry
1977]
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have likewise become hesitant to provide financing.' Equity financ-
ing has also become impractical as the market value of the airlines'
equity shares has declined below book value." With such tradi-
tional sources of public financing strained at best, the airline in-
dustry will be hard pressed to raise funds for future growth and
replacement to comply with FAR 36 guidelines.
Adding to the problems of poor earnings, a high debt/equity
ratio, and the difficulty of obtaining public financing is the uncer-
tainty created by potential deregulation of the industry. In early
1977, Senators Howard Cannon and Edward Kennedy introduced
the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977.' Under
this Act, Congress proposes to return the industry to profitability
by reforming the present regulatory structure of the industry over
a gradual period of years, thereby increasing competition within
the industry."4 Deregulation, however, would create uncertainty in
the financial community due to an inability to project a carrier's
future operating results stemming from the lender's inability to
fully predict in advance the nature of the competitive environ-
ment.' This uncertainty would make it extremely difficult to
structure any financing for several years, further complicating the
ability of the industry to obtain public financing to meet FAR 36.
In light of the high debt/equity ratios which would remain after
deregulation, it seems unlikely that any financing could be ob-
tained until said ratios were reduced to those levels acceptable for
nonregulated industries."6 Taking into consideration the industry's
equipment needs for growth, replacement, and increasing operating
efficiencies inherent in new technology, the inability of the industry
the lending community would find any ratio greater than 40:60 unacceptable;
however, in the airline industry the ratio is higher. Jenkins, supra note 39, at 580.
61 In addition to unreasonably high debt to equity ratios, the insurance com-
panies were primary lenders for the wide-bodied aircraft. At present the in-
surance companies, the main source of long-term debt financing, hold $2.6 billion
of airline debt. Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 585.
6" For example, at the end of 1966, the market value of trunk airline equities
was $6.7 billion and the book value was $2.4 billion. In the third quarter of 1975,
the market value had fallen to $2.5 billion and the book value had risen to $4.1
billion. James, supra note 38, at 507.
62S. 689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).




to gain the necessary financing would be devastating.
As can be seen, the industry's financial state is quite poor. With-
out timely rate increases by the CAB to offset the rising operational
costs caused by inflation, the industry will not be able to reduce
its debt significantly before present fleets of aircraft become eco-
nomically obsolete. Likewise, without substantially increased profit
margins, financing of the next generation of aircraft will be ex-
tremely difficult, not to mention the fiscal resources which will be
needed to meet the schedule for compliance with FAR 36.
Cost of Compliance with FAR 36 and Future Growth
The FAA has estimated that the cost of compliance with FAR
36 will ultimately increase by $5.5 to 7.6 billion the amount of
capital needed in 1985 by the airline industry." Cost projections
range from $740 million to $1.5 billion for the retrofit of all air-
craft which do not comply with FAR 36"8 with quiet nacelles."
As an alternative, it would cost from $7.7 to 9.7 billion to replace
all four engine turbojet aircraft (Boeing 707's and 720's and
McDonnell Douglas DC-8's) with a new technologically advanced
design and retrofit the remaining noncomplying aircraft with quiet
nacelles.' The exact cost of complying with FAR 36 noise regula-
tions will depend upon the replacement needs of the individual
airlines and the compliance status of their existing fleets.
The retrofitting of existing aircraft with redesigned engine na-
celles containing s6und absorbing materials provides the cheapest
means of compliance with FAR 36. The procedure of retrofitting
this equipment to specific aircraft can be accomplished by the
maintenance facilities of the individual airlines. 1 The price of a
shipsett would vary between $1.1 million in 1977 and $1.6 million
"7 Ellingsworth, supra note 18, at 13.
68 Id.
61 An engine nacelle is the protective enclosure surrounding the engine.
70 Ellingsworth, supra note 18, at 23.
71 Downtime for an aircraft having redesigned nacelles installed would vary
from 16 to 23 days for a Boeing 707 to seven hours for a Boeing 737. Airport &
Aircraft Noise Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1977)
(statement by Vaughn L. Blumenthal) [hereinafter cited as Blumenthal].
71 A shipset represents the number of quiet nacelles necessary to retrofit a
single airplane.
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in 1981"'. The cost of retrofitting two- and three-engine turbofan
airplanes would be significantly lower; $163,000 for a Boeing 727
and $220,400 for a Boeing 737." Effective compliance for all
types of aircraft could be accomplished by the January 1, 1985,
deadline, assuming that the manufacturers receive the necessary
production orders by the end of 1977."
Despite the relatively inexpensive means of compliance this
type of retrofitting offers when compared with other alternatives,
drawbacks do exist in its application. One of the primary concerns
with this type of retrofitting is that no guarantee exists that a further
reduction in the acceptable noise limits of FAR 36 will not occur."
Such a reduction in FAR 36 noise levels would require additional
expenditures of fiscal resources on aircraft which are the product
of twenty to twenty-five year old technology." The use of sound
absorbing materials in engine nacelles will meet current FAR 36
noise levels. Aircraft so retrofitted, however, will not be able to
meet the most recent noise abatement proposals set forth by the
FAA." Further, the return on investment for retrofitting with sound
absorbing materials would not provide any improvement in fuel
consumption or reduction in emission of air pollutants which can
be had with new technologically advanced equipment. Rather,
the redesigned nacelles would result in weight and performance
loss by the modified aircraft." With the constant increase in the
7' These prices are based upon an assumed retrofit of 400 aircraft. Blumenthal,
supra note 71, at 87-88. The cost for a set of quiet nacelles for a Boeing 707
could run as high as $2.5 million depending upon the quantity sold and time of
purchase.
74 Id. at 88.
5 Retrofit kits for the Boeing 707 would be available for installation on exist-
ing aircraft 28 months after receipt of sufficient firm orders for Boeing to order
a production go-ahead. For two- and three-engine aircraft the kits are already
available and are factory installed on new production aircraft. Id.
"' Proposed reductions to FAR 36 noise limits have already been published by
the Environmental Protection Agency in the Federal Register. See Notice for Pro-
posed Rulemaking No. 76-22, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (1976).
7" Airport & Aircraft Nose Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 203 (1977) (statement by Frank Borman).
" The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed a further re-
duction in noise levels. See FAA 75-37C, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,375 (1976).
"Data from the airframe manufacturers to the Air Transportation Associa-
tion indicates that if all non-FAR 36 ,ircraft in the U.S. fleet were retrofitted to
meet the 1969 version of FAR 36 nois: rules, it would increase fuel consumed by
COMMENTS
price of fuel, a proportionate increase in equipment efficiency be-
comes mandatory to offset this increased expense.
Some of the problems presented by retrofitting existing aircraft
with quiet nacelles can be solved by alternative means, although
they require an increase in cost. The concept of using new engine
technology on existing airframes provides an alternative to retro-
fitting with quiet nacelles where the aircraft still possesses a sub-
stantial useful life. New technology engines would provide improved
fuel economy and less pollution, while at the same time providing
better than minimal conformance with the FAR 36 requirements."'
The technology presently exists to re-engine all non-complying
aircraft. The Pratt & Whitney JT8D-209"' and the General Elec-
tric/SNECMA CFM562 both provide an alternative power source
for modification of existing fleets of narrow-bodied aircraft, pro-
viding both increased thrust and decreased fuel consumption.
These engines are high bypass turbofans which eliminate much of
the "shearing" noise created by hot exhaust gases as they leave the
core of the jet engine." Such noise cannot be effectively reduced
by the application of sound absorbing materials in the engine na-
celles." Through this technique engine noise can be significantly
4,000 barrels per day, which could approach approximately $20 million extra
cost per year (depending on fuel costs). Airport & Aircraft Noise Reduction:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977) (statement by W.L. Roden-
baugh [hereinafter cited as Rodenbaugh].
"Airport & Aircraft Noise Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 54 (1977) (statement by David J. Hines) [hereinafter cited as Hines].
"' The JT8D-209 is a derivative of the existing JT8D engine which powers the
Boeing 727 and 737 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-9. It employs a new single
stage fan and low rotor with existing JT8D engine core to produce 18,000 pounds
of thrust, and substantial noise reduction along with fuel consumption improve-
ments compared with basic JT8D models. Id. at 50, 51, and 53.
"2 The CFM56 is an all-new high bypass ratio engine with a maximum thrust
of 22,000 pounds and an increased fuel efficiency of 15-25% over existing en-
gines in the same size class. Rodenbaugh, supra note 79, at 66.
'" The "shearing" noise of turbojet engines is significantly reduced in the high
bypass engine by extracting energy from the high velocity jet core to drive the
fan. This increases the engine airflow and surrounds the lower velocity jet ex-
haust with a ring of even lower velocity cold air expelled by the fan. Rodenbaugh,
supra note 79, at 67.
"'The "shearing" noise created by turbofan engines is not a radated sound
and for this reason cannot be effectively controlled by sound absorbing materials.
Id.
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reduced to levels below those proposed by the FAA," and without
the use of sound absorbing materials in the engine nacelles.
Although the retrofitting of aircraft with newer engines provides
both a substantial increase in operating efficiency for existing
aircraft and a drastic reduction in noise emitted, the costs of such
an endeavor are significant. To retrofit a McDonnell Douglas DC-8
with GE/SNECMA CFM56 refanned engines would cost $7.8
million per aircraft, nearly one-third the cost of a replacement air-
craft."' However, the benefits would be substantial in terms of
decreased noise; eleven to fifteen EPNdB." A similar retrofit of
the CFM56 engine to the Boeing 707 would be comparably priced
and is in the development stages."' When coupled with fleet life
extension programs, the retrofitting of existing aircraft with new
technology engines provides an economically improved aircraft
for use into the late 1980's and beyond. This alternative would
provide a more cost efficient means of complying with FAR 36
noise levels over the long-term use of the aircraft.
The best solution for meeting FAR 36, from the air carrier's
viewpoint, is the replacement of noncomplying and aging aircraft
with technologically advanced equipment that reduces both fuel
consumption and the number of persons in an area heavily affected
by aircraft noise. ' At present the only available replacement air-
craft which will meet the FAR 36 noise standards include the
last generation of wide-bodied aircrafte' and the newer versions
of the Boeing 727.1 None of these aircraft, however, are within
the range classification and the seating capacity deemed desirable
Notice For Proposed Rulemaking No. 76-22, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (1976).
81 J.p. Geddes, U.S. Aerospace Looks Forward to 1985, 32 INTERAVIA 574
(1977).
"7 Aircraft Noise Abatement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation and
Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on Science & Technology, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1975) (statement by Aubert L. Pike).
11 Boeing Commercial Airplane Company signed a contract with General
Electric and SNECMA in early 1977 for the development and flight testing of a
CFM56 powered B-707. News in Brief, 32 INTERAVIA 764 (1977).
8"Airport & Aircraft Noise Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transportation, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1977) (statement by John C. Brizendine) [hereinafter cited as Bri-
zendine].
"These include the Boeing 747, McDonnell Douglas DC-10, Lockheed
L-1011, and the Airbus A.300 for both long- and short-haul requirements.
"' See generally Brizendine, supra note 89, at 31.
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by the commercial carriers. The Boeing 727 is a 135 seat aircraft,
while the wide-bodied aircraft seat in excess of 275 passengers.
These capabilities are outside the 140 to 200 seat limit of the air-
craft projected to provide fifty percent of the world market through
the 1980's." At least for the present, the airlines must choose
either smaller aircraft which provide unsatisfactory service for the
passenger, or wide-bodied aircraft which lose money.
To meet the industry's need for increased capacity on short-haul
routes the aerospace companies will likely develop derivatives of
existing aircraft. Both the Boeing 737-300"s and the McDonnell
Douglas DC-9-80"' are stretched versions of existing aircraft with
a modified wing and new technology engines. For a medium to
long range replacement for the aging Boeing 707 and McDonnell
Douglas DC-8, the aerospace companies have proposed the de-
velopment of an entirely new generation of aircraft in the 200
seat category." The development costs for such a new generation
aircraft will total approximately $2 billion for design and tooling
by industry estimates."6 In comparison it cost $1.8 billion to de-
velop the DC-10 Series 10, 30, and 40 aircraft, a project that
would cost $3.6 billion today.' The cost of purchasing such a
new aircraft would be about $90,000 per seat, or $18 million for
a 200 seat aircraft, plus thirty-four percent of that figure for spare
parts, new ground support equipment, and new facilities." Thus,
92J.P. Geddes, U.S. Aerospace Looks Forward to 1985, 32 INTERAVIA 577
(1977).
"'The Boeing 737-300 will be an enlarged version of the present 737-200
powered by the JT8D-209 engine. It will carry about 140 passengers over 1500
nautical miles. See The World of Aerospace, 32 INTERAVIA 559 (1977).
" The DC-9-80, powered by the JT8D-209 engine, is a stretched version of
the DC-9-50. It will carry 137 passengers in mixed seating (170 in economy) a
distance of 1700 nautical miles. At present, McDonnell Douglas has received 27
firm orders and nine options for the aircraft with initial deliveries scheduled for
1980. D.E. Fink, DC-9-80 Stretch Gets Go-Ahead, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 24, 1977, at 26.
' These designs include the Boeing 767 and 777 (for a general description of
these aircraft see 33 INTERAVIA 154-155), the McDonnell Douglas DC-X-200 and
the Airbus A.300-BlOX. In addition, Lockheed proposes a two-engine version of
its L-1011 design.
" J.P. Geddes, U.S. Aerospace Looks Forward to 1985, 32 INTERAVIA 574
(1977).
7 Id.
"The Future of Aviation: A Compilation of Papers Prepared by the Sub-
comm. on Aviation and Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on Science
1977]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the cost of a new replacement aircraft for the 508 Boeing 707
and 720 and McDonnell Douglas DC-8s presently in service"
will exceed $12 billion in present dollars. The investment of these
tremendous sums of money does not include the cost of modifying
the 1,078 noncomplying two- and three-engine aircraft to meet
FAR 36 guidelines, or the expenditures necessary for growth in
the industry.
For this reason it is impractical to replace all of the four-engine
turbojet aircraft which do not comply with FAR 36. There is
general agreement between the government and the industry that
to retrofit these aging aircraft (Boeing 707's and McDonnell
DC-8's) with quiet nacelles would not provide the best utilization
of existing resources.'" Rather, given adequate financing, the air
carriers have indicated they would replace approximately two-
thirds of the older four-engine Boeing 707 and McDonnell Douglas
DC-8 aircraft and retrofit the remainder with new technology
engines at a cost of about $7.2 billion.'' In addition, all two-
and three-engine DC-9s, Boeing 737s, and Boeing 727s which
do not presently comply with FAR 36 standards would likely be
retrofitted with quiet nacelles at a cost of approximately $268
million.' Such a combination of retrofitting aircraft with both
quiet nacelles and new technology engines and replacement of
obsolete aircraft would provide the best solution to meeting the
requirements of FAR 36. This approach will allow for the appli-
cation of new advanced technology which will aid in the alleviation
of increasing operational costs.
Without taking into account the federal noise requirements,
the FAA estimates that between 1976 and 1985 the trunk carriers
will need from 700 to 800 new aircraft to meet the projected in-
and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1976) (statement by Andrew M.
de Vorsney).
"' Estimate by the FAA. See note 16 supra.
100Airport & Aircraft Noise Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 525 (1977) (statement by Brock Adams) [hereinafter cited as Adams].
101 Id.
102 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AIRLINE EQUIPMENT NEEDS AND FINANCING
THROUGH 1985 at v (1976).
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crease in traffic' and the replacement of aging aircraft. ' " The
cost of these aircraft has been estimated at $32 billion by the
FAA.1" Of this amount, the FAA estimates that the airlines
are capable of internally generating approximately $15 billion
through depreciation and the sale of used aircraft. ' This would
leave $17 billion to be generated from the airline's net earnings
and external sources of financing to meet the industry's 1985 fiscal
requirements."7 When one analyzes these capital requirements in
light of the present earnings of the industry, it becomes obvious that
much of the necessary capital to finance the acquisition of new
equipment, as well as the cost of compliance with FAR 36 noise
standards, will have to come from new sources outside the airline
industry.
Proposed Means of Financing Compliance
with FAR 36 Requirements
Historically, the airline's prime source of funds for financing
aircraft purchases and fleet modernization has been from internal
cash generation; i.e., depreciation and net earnings. °' These in-
ternal funds have been supplemented by commercial bank loans,
103 Projected traffic growth has been estimated at approximately 5.6% per
year, as measured in revenue passenger miles, to 1985. Id. at 1.
104 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 25
(1976).
105 ld.
101 Id. at 26.
107 Source and Uses of Funds (Mid-Range Estimates)
Use of Funds: ($ Billions)
Property, Plant & Equipment $26
Debt repayment and Other 6
$32
Source of Funds:
Depreciation and Sale of Used Aircraft $15
Amount Required from Earnings & External Sources $17
Earning Assumption* 6
External Financing Requirement $11
* Assumes a 9% return on equity when the average rate of return
for the past five years has been 2.8%. It also assumes no sub-
stantial increase in fuel or other costs or another recession.
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 26 (1976).
108 The Future of Aviation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation and
Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on Science & Technology, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976) (statement by Frederick W. Bradley, Jr.) [hereinafter
cited as Bradley, Future of Aviation].
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long term loans from institutional lenders, the sale of equity and
convertible subordinated debentures in the public market, and
leasing.' At present, the airlines do not possess sufficient internal
resources,110 nor do they have access to the normal capital markets,
to finance major new programs."' Due to the difficulty in obtaining
financing from these traditional sources the airlines will be forced
to look to alternate means of obtaining capital to meet the cost
of complying with noise emission requirements and purchasing
new equipment A number of possible alternative capital sources
have been suggested to supplement income generated by the air-
lines and what private financing is made available. The use of
funds from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, '12 the implementa-
tion of a two percent surcharge on air fares and waybills, govern-
ment guaranteed loans for purchasing replacement aircraft, and
tax incentives are all methods proposed by the federal government
to aid in alleviating the air carrier's financial burden.
The use of the uncommitted balance of funds available from the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund is one of the methods recom-
mended to aid the airlines in complying with the FAR 36 noise
requirements. As of October 1, 1976, the trust fund surplus was
$1.334 billion with projected surplus revenues of an additional
$777 million in the next four years." ' These funds, as proposed by
Rep. Mineta in H.R. 14027,"' would be applied to financing
either the retrofit of existing aircraft or the replacement of non-
complying aircraft. The amount of capital applicable to any single
aircraft would not exceed the cost of retrofitting that aircraft with
quiet nacelles."' This bill, if enacted, would authorize $300 million
a year for the fiscal years 1977 through 1980 with a five year man-
datory timetable for compliance."' At the end of this five year
log ld.
110 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT PoLIcY 25
(1976).
"' See Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 584-87.
"' Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, Tit.
III, sec. 207, 84 Stat. 250 (1970).
113 Aircraft Noise: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976)
(statement by Norman Y. Mineta) [hereinafter cited as Mineta].
"
4 H.R. 14027, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
"' Mineta, supra note 113, at 11.
"Id. at 13.
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period the bill would automatically terminate with 100 percent
compliance with the FAR 36 standards having been achieved.11 '
Government loan guarantees and tax incentives would provide
further relief to allow the retrofitting of existing noncomplying air-
craft and the purchase of new equipment. The Aircraft Guarantee
Loan Act of 195711 could provide government-guaranteed loans
for purchasing new equipment if it were modified to include all
air carriers.11 The act would also have to be modified to include
higher borrowing limits, since at present each qualified air carrier
is entitled to borrow only $10 million. In addition, tax incentives
have been created. The airlines can now apply their oldest tax in-
vestment credits1 ' first, thus reducing the chances that credits will
expire before they can be used. 1' For 1977 and 1978, the carriers
can offset 100 percent of their federal tax bills with available
credits, rather than the former fifty percent maximum. ' A refund
of these investment credits can be utilized to boost the industry's
profits. Such an increase in profits will aid in the financing of the
necessary retrofitting or replacement of noncomplying aircraft with
FAR 36.
At present, however, it would seem that the primary means of
government financial assistance to the air carriers will come in the
form of the two percent surcharge on air fares and waybills. The
Department of Transportation has recommended this concept in
' The eight year time schedule imposed by the FAA at 14 C.F.R. § 91.305(b)
to meet FAR 36 noise limits is longer than the proposed five year plan of H.R.
14027. This conflict, as well as others, contributed to the failure of H.R. 14027
to reach the House floor for debate.
118 Aircraft Guarantee Loan Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-307, 71 Stat. 629
(1957).
1' As enacted, the Aircraft Guarantee Loan Act of 1957 restricts the guaran-
tee of loans to aircraft purchased by local, feeder, or short-haul air transportation
companies. Aircraft Guarantee Loan Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-307, 5 1, 71
Stat. 629 (1957).
120INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 46(a)(1) (Prentice-Hall 1977).
1 T. Canning, Air Transportation Analysis, STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY
SURVEYS A64 (1977). Approximately $680 million in investment tax credits were
to expire between 1975 and 1981. Without such a modification in the tax laws,
a large percentage of these tax credits would have been lost. Aviation Economics:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Review and the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transportation,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (statement by E.E. Carlson).
122T. Canning, Air Transportaton Analysis, STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY
SURVEYs A64 (1977).
1977]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
its proposal to Congress for financing compliance with FAR 36. '
That proposal, in addition to recommending the two percent sur-
charge, outlines a program which includes:
(1) a $2 surcharge on international departures;
(2) a reduction of the current passenger ticket and waybill tax
by two percentage points for all airlines;
(3) a requirement that airlines requesting the surcharge, under
guidance of the CAB, deposit revenues from the surcharge
in a separate environmental fund;
(4) a provision permitting the use of monies in these funds to
pay up to 100 percent of the cost of retrofitting existing
aircraft that do not meet FAR 36 standard; up to thirty-
five percent of the cost of acquiring replacement aircraft
which comply with FAR 36 standards; or up to the full cost
of retrofitting present aircraft with new technology engines
(provided such engines enable the aircraft to comply with
FAR 36 standards), but not to exceed an amount equal
to the allowances for a suitable replacement aircraft; and
(5) a provision requiring any airline whose surcharge revenues
reach an amount equal to the allowable costs under this
proposal to terminate its surcharge.!"4
This program, if enacted, would aid in assuring compliance with
the FAR 36 noise standards by the airlines within the time limits
established by the FAA. It would provide an incentive for replace-
ment of obsolete and noisy aircraft with new technologically ad-
vanced equipment. In addition, it would place the burden of financ-
ing on the users of the industry's services without increasing air-
fare and waybill prices.
A similar program has been proposed by Rep. Anderson in the
House of Representatives." In his bill there would also be three
options for compliance: the retrofitting of aircraft with sound
absorbing material, retrofitting of aircraft with new technology
engines, or the replacement of aircraft which do not presently
comply with FAR 36.1"' As in the Department of Transportation's
proposal, the funding would be provided by a two percent sur-
121 Adams, supra note 100, at 525.
124 Id.
125 H.R. 8729, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
"2H.R. 8729, Tit. III, § 302(b)(1)(B) (1977).
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charge on air fares and waybills."7 However, the bill would allow
the funding of only fifty percent of the cost of retrofitting any given
aircraft."' In the case of retrofitting existing noncomplying aircraft
with new technology engines, seventy-five percent of the cost of
retrofitting would be allowed. This allowance, however, shall not
exceed forty percent of the cost of replacing that aircraft with a
comparable aircraft." ' To replace a non-complying aircraft with
a complying aircraft, forty percent of the cost of a replacement
aircraft, which complies with Amendment 36-7"' of FAR 36,
would be allowed.1"' Here, as in the Department of Transporation's
proposal, the funds would be deposited in a separate account.
Unlike the Department of Transportation's proposal, however,
funds collected in excess of the maximum amount needed by any
single carrier would be transferred to the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund.3" The further difference between the Department of Trans-
portation's proposal and H.R. 8729 is that the latter restricts the
seating capacity of the replacement aircraft to an increase of only
seven percent,'31 thus allowing funds generated under the bill to be
applied only to replacement of non-complying aircraft with similar
sized aircraft.
This bill provides a substantial amount of financial aid to the
airlines for compliance with FAR 36, but severely restricts its use
by the air carriers. The emphasis is placed upon retrofit and not
upon the utilization of new technologically advanced equipment
through the retrofitting of existing aircraft with newer engines or
the replacement of noncomplying aircraft.
In addition to H.R. 8729, two other bills have been introduced
in Congress to establish a program for the reduction of aircraft
noise.1  These bills would provide a program for reduced noise by
amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Airport and
127H.R. 8729, Tit. III, S 303(a)(1) (1977).
128H.R. 8729, Tit. III, § 303(b)(2)(A) (1977).
1
-H.R. 8729, Tit. I1, § 303(b)(2)(B) (1977).
'42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977).
131 H.R. 8729, Tit. III, S 303(b) (1) (C) (1977). Only 25% of the cost of re-
placement would be allowed for an aircraft which does not meet Amendment
36-7 (42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977)) to FAR 36.
112H.R. 8729, Tit. III, § 303(b)(5) (1977).
"'3H.R. 8729, Tit. III, § 303(c)(1) (1977).
134S. 747 and H.R. 3802, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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Airway Development Act of 1970." Both bills have been sent to
committee; H.R. 3802 to the House Committee on Public Works
and Transportation, and S. 747 to the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation.3 '
The above proposals utilize federal aid to the airline industry.
In order to supplement the funding generated by federal legislation
there must be some program of self-help established by the air
carriers. The allowance of timely rate increases by the CAB to
offset the ever increasing operational expenses incurred due to
inflation and increased operating expenses is necessary.'
To further combat the inflationary impact upon the acquisition
of new technologically superior equipment, an alteration in the
present depreciation accounting method should be implemented.
At present it is impossible to replace an existing aircraft with the
same type aircraft after depreciation over a twelve to fifteen year
period (the industry standard)'38 due to inflation."9 The deprecia-
tion costs are understated since depreciation is based upon the his-
torical purchase price of an asset rather than the current acquisi-
tion costs of that asset.'" An alteration in accounting practices
to alleviate the impact of inflation would aid in the generation of
internal capital by taking into consideration the rate of inflation
when depreciating equipment, and thus reflecting the true replace-
ment cost of an asset.
A combination of self-help programs in the airline industry,
when coupled with the proposed federal legislation to aid in the
financing of the compliance with FAR 36, will provide the neces-
sary funding for timely compliance. The replacement of aging air-
"CONGRESSIONAL INDEX (CCH) 14,182 and 28,360 (1977-78).
1w Id.
137 At present, it appears that airline operating costs are rapidly outpacing the
general inflationary rate. Bradley, Future of Aviation, supra note 108, at 96.
038 Aircraft retirement was based in the past on a 15 year life, but has now
been extended to 17 or 18 years, with some aircraft even going up to 20 years.
J.P. Geddes, U.S. Aerospace Looks Forward to 1985, 32 INTERAVIA 577 (1977).
"' Future of Aviation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation & Trans-
portation R. & D. of the Comm. on Science & Technology, 94 Cong., 2d Sess.
291 (1976) (statement by Frank Borman).
1' In the period from 1965 to 1974, depreciation was understated at the actual
inflation levels experienced by over 1.1 billion. The Future of Aviation: A Com-
pilation of Papers prepared by the Subcomm. on Aviation and Transportation
R & D of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
241 (1976) (statement by Klaus P. Heiss).
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craft and the retirement of present long-term debts will absorb the
profits which the airlines are presently generating. Financing from
institutional lenders for the retrofitting of existing noncomplying
aircraft cannot be obtained. 1" Likewise, commercial bank financing
is impossible to obtain for those airlines with uncommonly high
debt to equity ratios,'' and difficult at best for the remainder of
the air carriers due to a loss of investor confidence in the in-
dustry.'" Therefore, some form of a federal aid program for the
financing of noise abatement programs will be necessary for the
airline industry to meet the requirements of the federal govern-
ment's noise abatement policy.
Conclusion
The industry has shown a slight profit margin in 1976,'" and
through three-quarters of 1977 the industry is showing a further
increase in profits.' Given this increase in profit margins, and
assuming it will continue without a substantial increase in opera-
tional costs, it is possible that the industry can, meet the replace-
ment requirements of some 500 aircraft. To expect the airlines
to generate sufficient capital internally to meet these replacement
requirements, however, let alone present debt obligations and a
federally imposed noise abatement policy, is unrealistic.'" The
carriers are not in a position to handle retrofit, a replacement pro-
141 Insurance lenders have flatly stated that they will not finance retrofit. Air-
port & Aircraft Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 171
(1977) (statement by John S. Bliven) [hereinafter cited as Bliven].
'4 A ratio ranging from 1.5:1 to 1.75:1, defined as total debt, including capi-
talized aircraft leases, to net worth, has been considered prudent for the airline
industry compared to a ratio of I to 1 for most borrowers. Airport & Aircraft
Noise Reduction: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1977)
(statement by Frederick W. Bradley, Jr.).
'" Bradley, Aviation Economics, supra note 29, at 589.
1"See text accompanying note 57 supra.
141 The domestic trunks have experienced a 6% gain in revenue passenger
miles in the first nine months of 1977. International travel has been growing
faster, with a 7.1% gain in the first nine months. Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1977,
at 25, col. 1.
1' Despite this increase in profits, the industry's earnings are still significantly
below the CAB's recommended return on investment of 12% for a healthy in-
dustry.
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gram, and commit to a new technology aircraft. " Outside sources
of financing will not be available to meet these demands until the
confidence of the leading community can be regained. To do so
will require a substantial increase in profit and a corresponding de-
crease in debt of the industry. At the same time, the uncertainty of
deregulation must be removed from the industry. Without such
happenings, the future of the aviation industry will remain clouded.
To insure a future healthy industry, the airlines will have to
receive further rate increases from the CAB."' With an increased
profit margin and an alteration in present accounting procedures,
the industry can generate the necessary internal capital to reduce
the present debt to equity ratios. With a decrease in these ratios,
long-term financing will again become available as the lending
institution's confidence in the industry returns.
In the short term, federal funding will be necessary to aid the
industry in meeting the noise standards imposed by the FAA. A
program similar to that proposed by the Department of Trans-
portation' would allow for a reasonable assurance of timely com-
pliance by the air transportation industry. This would be done
without the depletion of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund re-
serves, without any one element of the industry subsidizing an-
other element, without a related increase in airfares, and with only
a minimum of federal involvement. Such a proposal allows the
industry to determine its needs and how best to meet the standards
established by the FAA. At the same time, the industry would be
encouraged to utilize new noise reduction technology on existing
aircraft and in replacement aircraft. Without such a program, the
airlines will not be capable of generating the necessary capital to
comply with the federally imposed noise abatement policy and
meet future fleet modernization and equipment needs.
14' Bliven, supra note 141, at 171.
148 These rate increases should be based upon future inflationary cost rises,
not on past increases in operational expenses as has been the standard practice by
the CAB. See R.K. Ellingsworth, Shifts in Fare Standards Seen, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 29, 1977, at 24.
... Adams, supra note 100, at 524.
